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Abstract
In this article, we examine how the social disturbance precipitated by ‘fake news’ 
can be viewed as a kind of infrastructural uncanny. We suggest that the threat of 
problematic and viral junk news can raise existential questions about the routine 
circulation, engagement and monetisation of content through the Web and social media. 
Prompted by the unsettling effects associated with the ‘fake news’ scandal, we propose 
methodological tactics for exploring (1) the link economy and the ranking of content, 
(2) the like economy and the metrification of engagement and (3) the tracker economy 
and the commodification of attention. Rather than focusing on the misleading content 
of junk news, such tactics surface the infrastructural conditions of their circulation, 
enabling public interventions and experiments to interrogate, challenge and change their 
role in reconfiguring relations between different aspects of social, cultural, economic 
and political life.
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Infrastructural concerns
Double trouble: fabricating Le Soir in 1943 and 2017
In August 2017, The Guardian published an article about ‘fake news twins’, 
‘Doppelgänger’ and ‘lookalike’ sites with near-identical domain names and appearances 
to news websites such as Al-Jazeera, The Atlantic and Belgian Le Soir, which were used 
to spread false and misleading claims (The Guardian, 2017). A ‘clone’ of Le Soir, for 
instance, was used to propagate false claims about presidential candidate being finan-
cially backed by Saudi Arabia (Figure 1; CrossCheck, 2017).
Interestingly, this was not the first time that a ‘second Le Soir’ was in circulation 
(Istas, 1993). In November 1943, Belgian resistance movement Front de l'Indépendance 
circulated an elaborate satirical fake issue of Le Soir which took aim at Hitler, Nazis and 
Belgian collaborators, complete with fabricated advertisements, events and obituaries 
(Figure 2). The ‘Faux Soir’ made its way into official distribution channels and was sold 
through kiosks in Brussels.
Both cases involved meticulous reproduction of visual and editorial conventions of Le 
Soir which would make them ‘passable’: typefaces, images and layout. However, it is not 
just resemblance in content that we want to draw attention to but also the different infra-
structures involved in their production, distribution and monetisation. The 1943 ‘Faux 
Soir’ depended on printing machinery, typesetting and scarce paper supplies, as well as 
volunteers who sabotaged distribution vans and put their own copies into kiosks at par-
ticular times to catch workers on the way home.
The copycat Le Soir of 2017 required a domain name, skills to clone the site and the 
means to distribute it on social media and other online ‘spaces’, including a posting on 
Figure 1. LeSoir.info in February 2017 (left) and LeSoir.be in March 2017 (right).
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a far-right website and a tweet from Marion Maréchal-Le Pen (grand-daughter of the 
founder of far-right party Front National). While these were both removed shortly after 
publication (CrossCheck, 2017), the website continued to be discussed and shared 
online both as evidence of the article’s claims and as debunking of misleading informa-
tion. While the 1943 double was shut down, equipment was destroyed and people were 
arrested, the 2017 fabrication remained freely available online, the infrastructures sus-
taining its circulation being uncannily indistinguishable from those of the original.
‘Fake news’ as infrastructural uncanny
Both cases of fabricating Le Soir in 1943 and 2017 involved interventions around par-
ticular sociotechnical arrangements through which news is made available to its readers, 
which can be understood as infrastructures. The phenomenon of ‘fake news’ problema-
tises not only what is said but also the very conditions of sayability: the digital infrastruc-
tures that mediate the circulation of online content. In this article, we examine how ‘fake 
news’ can render such infrastructures problematic. We focus on the notion of the ‘infra-
structural uncanny’ as a way to characterise the anxieties and questions that emerge in 
relation to the farming and circulation of junk news (Howard et al., 2017; Venturini, 2019; 
for discussions of junk news in the context of professional journalism see Harrington, 
2008; McCartney, 1977).1
The infrastructural uncanny prompted by junk news can be seen not just as a quandary 
but also as an opportunity. As Nicholas Royle (2003) argues, the ‘critical elaboration [of 
the uncanny] is necessarily bound up with analysing, questioning and even transforming 
what is called “everyday life”’ (p. 23). To give a recent example from uncanny studies, 
Lepselter (2016) argues that theories about aliens and conspiracies bear the trace of the 
unsettling effects of colonialism and downward social mobility.
To illustrate how the uncanny arises in relation to digital infrastructures in situated 
contexts of use, we draw on to approaches from uncanny, infrastructure and new media 
studies. We propose that junk news may be taken not just as an opportunity to fix plat-
forms and to strengthen expert-centric knowledge cultures (Marres, 2018) but also for 
public experiments to interrogate, challenge and change how these infrastructures par-
ticipate in economic, cultural and political life. In this sense, we treat it as an ‘empirical 
occasion’ in which the relations between publics, claims, content producers, advertising 
markets, investors and others through digital platforms become visible and accessible for 
social analysis and societal debate (Marres, 2013, 2015, 2017).
To this end, we present three ‘scenographies’ (Latour, 2008) examining infrastruc-
tures and practices involved in ranking content, metrifying engagement and commodi-
fying attention. These draw on methodological recipes in A Field Guide to ‘Fake News’ 
and Other Information Disorders (fakenews.publicdatalab.org), a Public Data Lab pro-
ject that we co-investigated in collaboration with a network of researchers, students and 
practitioners (Bounegru et al., 2018). Such recipes may be of interest not just for their 
analytical capacities (in producing knowledge about the social) but also for their inter-
active capacities ‘in order to gauge the affordances of digital settings for more respon-
sive, engaged or creative styles of social enquiry’ (Marres, 2017).
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Infrastructure studies and uncanny studies
The term ‘infrastructure’ has a rich history and has been put to work in different ways 
by practitioners and researchers (Peters, 2015). We draw on a set of critical approaches 
associated with ‘infrastructure studies’ (Bowker et al., 2009; Bowker and Star, 2000; 
Edwards et al., 2009; Larkin, 2013; Star, 1999; Star and Ruhleder, 1996), and in particu-
lar the view that infrastructures may be viewed in terms of relations rather than as things 
(Star, 1999).
The scenographies below complement recent interest in how platform studies and 
infrastructure studies might learn from each other (Helmond, 2015; Plantin et al., 2016). 
The layering and pastiche of web components and social media channels, each with their 
own dependencies and histories, perhaps affirms the suggestion that ‘growing’ rather 
than ‘building’ may be a more appropriate metaphor for understanding the dynamics of 
digital infrastructures as distributed, collective accomplishments (Jackson et al., 2007). 
Platforms attempt to accommodate a wide variety of use scenarios, by decentralising 
programmable platform features and centralising platform data (Helmond, 2015). Junk 
news content suggests some of the ways in which these platforms and infrastructures 
may have unintended effects.
As Edwards (2003) puts it, one of the notable characteristics of these ‘circulatory 
systems’ is they are ‘not salient for most people, most of the time’ and ‘reside in a natu-
ralised background, as ordinary and unremarkable to us as trees, daylight and dirt’ 
(p. 185). While they are a fundamental characteristic of contemporary life (such that 
‘to be modern is to live within and by means of infrastructures’), Edwards (2003) 
argues along with Star and others that ‘we notice them mainly when they fail, which 
they rarely do’ (pp. 185–186). Infrastructures can become visible in different ways, 
including in breakdown (Star, 1999) and failures to align with expectations (Gray 
et al., 2018). In the case of ‘fake news’, digital infrastructures became salient as ‘matters 
of concern’ (Latour, 2004) not just due to breakdown or failure, but rather because of 
success in ways other than hoped for.
We draw on the notion of the infrastructural uncanny to characterise some of the unu-
sual, concerning, and unexpected effects that infrastructures may give rise to. This notion 
has been proposed by Geoghegan (2016) to refer to ‘a range of unsettling phenomena that 
tend to emerge in periods of rapid expansion in the means of technological conveyance’ 
(p. 900). Taking cue from this starting point – which arises in relation to the emergence of 
spiritualism in parallel with infrastructures such as railways, telegraphs and canals in the 
19th century – we explore how the uncanny may also be apt for the study of digital 
infrastructures.
The uncanny has been described as a ‘master trope’ in cultural studies and other fields 
in the 1990s (Jay, 2012; cf. Collins and Jervis, 2008; Royle, 2003). It was partly popular-
ised by the reception and influential engagements with Freud’s (2003) 1919 essay on 
Das Unheimliche: literally the ‘unhomely’ and usually rendered as ‘uncanny’. Freud 
quotes Schelling’s suggestion that the uncanny is ‘everything that was meant to remain 
secret and hidden and has come into the open’ (p. 132). He argues that the uncanny is not 
simply the unfamiliar, but the ‘species of the frightening that goes back to what was once 
well known and had long been familiar’ (p. 124), referring to examples of automata and 
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the agency of inanimate objects which come alive (p. 135) and the figure of the double 
or Doppelgänger (p. 141). Freud’s text responds to an essay by Jentsch emphasising the 
relationship between the uncanny and the habitual (Jentsch, 2008: pp. 218–219). 
Heidegger uses the concept as a means to ‘recognize and thematize what we ordinarily 
take for granted’ (Withy, 2015: 3).
Hoffmann’s short story ‘The Sandman’ is considered paradigmatic of the uncanny by 
Freud and many others. It mobilises a number of ambiguities, such as whether charac-
ters of Coppelius and Coppola are the same person, the status of an automaton called 
Olimpia, and whether characters are human or not, which drives the protagonist, 
Nathaniel, to madness.2 A recurring theme in the story is the perception of similarities, 
and the uncertainty about how to resolve ambiguities in apparent resemblance. For the 
purposes of this article, it is worth noting the role of the telescope, the device which 
facilitates the experience of uncanny similarity between the automaton Olimpia and 
Nathaniel’s fiancée Clara, by viewing them from a distance. Likewise, it is the taken-
for-granted mediating capacities of digital infrastructures – to commensurate, quantify, 
order and assemble – which give rise to uncanny effects in the case of ‘fake news’, 
prompting uncertainty and concern.
It has been suggested that the uncanny can be understood as a ‘distinctively modern 
experience’ arising in relation to emerging configurations of science, technology and 
urbanisation (Collins and Jervis, 2008), as well as a ‘response to the regime of the pro-
gramme’ as embodied in ambient information and communication technologies (Johnson, 
1999). Several scholars have explored the notion of the ‘digital uncanny’, arguing that 
we should attend to how the uncanny may be re-articulated through different media tech-
nologies (Coyne, 2005; Ravetto-Biagioli, 2016). Ravetto-Biagioli (2019) argues that 
with digital technologies, the uncanny may exceed the ‘emotional intensity or embodied 
perception’ that was the focus of earlier psychoanalytical readings, instead ‘forcing us to 
reflect on our relationship with computational media’. The case of junk news suggests 
that it is partly the agential capacities of digital infrastructures to configure, multiply and 
redistribute habits and relations in unexpected ways which generate unsettling ambi-
guities. While earlier studies focused on dichotomies of self/other, animate/inanimate, 
living/ dead, familiar/unfamiliar, more recent work explores how the uncanny may be 
used to inquire into the unsettling of space, architecture, technologies and media systems 
(Collins and Jervis, 2008; Vidler, 1994).
As well as uncanny doubles and copies (Schwartz, 1998), the uncanny may also 
emerge in relation to the unsettling effects and ambiguities that emerge from the partici-
pation of sociotechnical devices in the online circulation of content, including algo-
rithms, metrics, digital analytics, links, ads, content management systems and social 
media platforms. Commentators warn of ‘empathically optimised automated fake news’ 
(Bakir and McStay, 2018) and ‘reality apathy’ resulting from of destabilising combina-
tions of machine-learning, bot-amplification, video manipulation and online platforms 
(Warzel, 2018). The very same platforms and infrastructures which have been celebrated 
for broadening access to and involvement in the production of content, have become 
agents of ‘information disorder’ (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017).
The infrastructural uncanny manifests when the role of sociotechnical devices in the 
co-production of value, engagement, audience and social relations becomes unsettling 
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and generates ambiguities such that the way in which agency is distributed becomes dif-
ficult to untangle. For example, infrastructures for metrifying engagement may make it 
unclear whether likes or posts of junk news are the result of bots, algorithms, paid propa-
gandists, remote entrepreneurs or grassroots political activists. Agential ambiguities 
associated with the infrastructural uncanny can provide opportunities for alternative 
ways of accounting for and responding to troubling phenomena in digital societies.
Infrastructural scenographies
A matter of concern is what happens to a matter of fact when you add to it its whole scenography, 
much like you would do by shifting your attention from the stage to the whole machinery of a 
theatre. (Latour, 2008)
In this article, we take the infrastructural uncanny as an occasion for examining the role 
of various digital devices in organising content online. In so doing, we aim to extend the 
frame to account for not just problematic content but also the infrastructures through 
which it circulates, drawing on the Field Guide to ‘Fake News’ and Other Information 
Disorders (Bounegru et al., 2018).
The guide explores digital methods (Rogers, 2013) as a site for public involvement 
around junk content farming and circulation. Digital methods are informed by a sensibil-
ity that methods are not just means for understanding social life, they are also an impor-
tant part of it (Garfinkel, 1984). Indeed, online platforms have their own ‘baked in’ 
methods and infrastructures for tracing, quantifying, intensifying and valuing the activi-
ties of users. These methods can be repurposed in order to examine the interactions 
between social practices, digital devices and knowledge production (Marres, 2017). In 
the spirit of both ‘critical analytics’ (Rogers, 2018b) and ‘inventive methods’ (Lury and 
Wakeford, 2012), we utilise data from online platforms and devices in the service of 
quali-quantitative accounts of both the platformised fabric of the web and the online 
activity which it enables. This means that researchers need to actively work to align 
device affordances with their own questions (Marres and Gerlitz, 2015; Venturini et al., 
2018a). Through such analysis, we examine both dominant modes of counting, account-
ing for and ordering online content and the trouble that accompanies them.
Drawing on Latour’s (2008) notion of ‘scenographies’ which signals a shift from 
standalone ‘matters of fact’ to the conditions of their production, we propose methodo-
logical tactics for exploring the trouble of junk news. Our scenographies highlight how 
banal and habitual infrastructures (Chun, 2016) which have been adopted as methods for 
organising and accounting for our social lives (Marres, 2017) play out in the context of 
junk content farming and circulation. Prompted by the infrastructural uncanny, these 
scenographies suggest methodological tactics for examining the infrastructural produc-
tion of troubling ‘facts’ associated with ranking, metrification and tracking. Drawing on 
previous digital methods, tools and studies, these scenographies examine how the infra-
structural uncanny of junk news arises in relation to (1) the ‘link economy’ and the rank-
ing of content (Rogers, 2002), (2) the ‘like economy’ and the metrification of engagement 
(Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013; Helmond, 2015), and (3) tracking infrastructures and the 
monetisation of attention (Helmond, 2017; van der Velden, 2018).
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The link economy and the ranking of content
Our first scenography starts with the infrastructural uncanny prompted by the appearance 
of unwanted deceptive content in top Google search results where one would typically 
expect authoritative news sources to appear.
Immediately after the 2016 US presidential elections, it was reported that queries such 
as [final election results] on Google Search returned a story from ‘70news’ at the top of the 
results suggesting that Trump, rather than Clinton, had won the popular vote (Figure 3). 
The Washington Post (2016) ran the headline: ‘Google’s top news link for “final election 
results” goes to a fake news site with false numbers’. PEN America (2017) suggested the 
incident showed ‘the power of search engines to enable the spread of fraudulent news’. As 
one widely shared tweet put it, ‘reality is what people collectively believe’ and ‘SEO is the 
new reality’ (Raskin, 2016). How had a questionable claim from an obscure blog managed 
to surpass the country’s most well-known media organisations, making it to the top of 
Google Search results about one of the most prominent political events in the world? Surely 
this blog alone could not be the only culprit?
In this case, the infrastructural uncanny is not about the story itself, but its position-
ing at the top of search results. Because of their role in ordering and ranking content 
search engines can be viewed as ‘epistemological machines’ and ‘a potential collision 
space for alternative accounts of reality’ (Rogers, 2013: 31). The minimalist interface 
of Google Search has been said to contrast with the complexity and messiness involved 
in the selection of results (Rogers, 2018a: 7). Google has been criticised both of not 
taking enough action (eg. failing to tackle problematic content); as well as for taking 
too much action (eg. bias, censorship). PEN America (2017) has cautioned against 
Figure 3. Query for [final election results] on Google Search, CNET, November 2016.
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downplaying the substantive ‘moral and intellectual decisions about what content to 
privilege and what to de-emphasize’ (p. 43).
In addition to calls for ‘algorithmic accountability’ (Diakopoulos, 2015), recent 
research suggests that the algorithmic ordering of content should be understood as a 
distributed accomplishment, and that we should aspire to look across algorithmic sys-
tems as well as inside them (Ananny and Crawford, 2016) and consider algorithms as 
culture (Seaver, 2017). Making content orderable involves not only content and algo-
rithms (Rieder, 2012) but also a ‘link economy’ (Rogers, 2002) building atop of hyper-
links as a specific sociomaterial practice to encode connections between texts (Brügger, 
2017). There are also interplays between attempts to rise in the rankings (eg. search 
engine optimisation), and Google’s responses to attempts to ‘game’ their engine.
Our methodological tactic for this scenography draws on an approach called ‘search 
as research’ (Rogers, 2013: 95–124) to examine what is involved in ranking Web content. 
In particular, we repurpose Google results to explore referencing dynamics at work in the 
case of the ‘Pope Endorses Trump’ story, which BuzzFeed News reported to be the most 
engaged with ‘fake news’ story prior to the US elections (Silverman, 2016). Using a 
‘research browser’ (Rogers, 2013; Weltevrede, 2016) to mitigate for personalisation, we 
examined how it appeared in search results in March 2017. After gathering URLs men-
tioning the story on Google Search, we undertook a qualitative analysis of which sources 
were associated with the story. Search engine ranking has ‘reactive’ effects (Espeland 
Figure 4. Network graph showing who mentions whom in Google search results in relation to 
the ‘Pope Endorses Trump’ story (Bounegru et al., 2018: 70–71).
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and Sauder, 2007) – including sites refraining from linking to junk news sources so as to 
avoid boosting the traffic and search engine scores of the latter, as well as to avoid being 
penalised by search engines themselves. So rather than limit our investigation to hyper-
linking practices (cf. Coddington, 2014; Faris et al., 2017; Venturini et al., 2018b), 
instead we opted for what we called a ‘referential network’, looking at both hyperlinks 
and textual references.
A network exploring who mentions whom in relation to the story (Figure 4) suggests 
that the three most widely cited sources in top Google search results are two junk news 
sources: WTOE 5 News (now a ‘fantasy news website for pet owners’) and Ending the Fed 
(taken down); as well as one fact-checking source: Snopes. Most sources debunk the story 
(green) rather than affirming it (orange). The network shows a strong presence of estab-
lished sources, such as mainstream media organisations and fact-checking initiatives.
Five months after the US elections, the link economy co-produced by practices of Google 
Search and its users seems to privilege the authority of fact checkers and news organisations 
(who have more visibility than junk news distributors in search engine results and their ref-
erences). While Google Search reinforces particular modes of link authority, the contrast 
with referencing practices highlights the ‘ghostly’ presence of junk news publishers and 
content despite the absence of hyperlinks and even after they have been taken offline.
Analysing referencing practices over time suggests that references from ‘debunkers’ 
may serve to amplify and perpetuate the online presence of this story. We created a time-
line to illustrate when pages were published and which other pages they refer (Figure 5). 
We observed that the original story on WTOE 5 News was hardly referenced for many 
months and that most of the pages in Google Search results date from after it is ‘laun-
dered’ (i.e. republished) by EndingtheFed.com. Both websites are widely referenced by 
debunkers despite the URLs not appearing in search results.
By repurposing search engine rankings to explore referencing dynamics between web 
pages, this scenography provides a different perspective on the interplay between search 
engines, hyperlinks and textual references enabling the uncanny appearance of junk con-
tent in top search results. It also explores how references to junk news stories may endure 
even after search engines take remedial action, and how debunkers can perhaps unex-
pectedly amplify the presence of junk stories.
The ‘like economy’ and the metrification of engagement
In the final three months of the US presidential campaign, the top-performing fake election 
news stories on Facebook generated more engagement than the top stories from major news 
outlets. (Silverman, 2016)
Our second scenography examines what enables the infrastructural uncanny of junk con-
tent apparently overtaking ‘real’ content, as well as different forms of distributed agency 
involved in the construction and metrification of engagement – such as bots, paid users 
and the residual data traces resulting from platform interactions which continue to oper-
ate after users have left the screen.
After the US elections, BuzzFeed News ran a piece on ‘How Viral Fake Election News 
Stories Outperformed Real News On Facebook’ (Silverman, 2016), including a graph 
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Figure 5. Timeline of sources mentioned in relation to ‘Pope Endorses Trump’ story 
(Bounegru et al., 2018: 74–75).
Figure 6. BuzzFeed news chart showing ‘fake news’ overtaking ‘mainstream news’ 
(Silverman, 2016).
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showing the red line of ‘fake news’ about elections overtaking the black line of ‘main-
stream news’ (Figure 6). Such reports were based on a notion of ‘engagement’ operation-
alised through an aggregated measure of shares, comments and reactions. The practices of 
metrifying engagement from which BuzzFeed’s analysis derives are made possible as a 
result of platforms such as Facebook being positioned as a kind of ‘social infrastructure’ 
(Zuckerberg, 2017), bringing about a shift from modes of valuation associated with the 
link economy to those associated with the like economy (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013). 
Though both links and likes are used to quantify audiences ‘as socially constructed by 
media industries, advertisers, and associated audience measurement firms’ (Napoli, 2010), 
they are associated with different forms of quantification and valuation.
This has given rise to concerns about fabricated, manipulated and misleading engage-
ment scores to spread ‘fake’, spammy and scammy content through ‘like farms’, ‘like 
fraud’ and ‘fake likes’ (De Cristofaro et al., 2014; Farooqi et al., 2017; Ikram et al., 
2017). Such phenomena can raise fundamental questions about the character of engage-
ment such as whether it is ‘real’ or ‘fake’, actual or potential, organic or manipulated, 
human or bot generated. How engagement is mediated, organised and made intelligible 
matters in different ways for investors, advertisers, propagandists, journalists, page 
administrators and users. While the like economy aims to make diverse activities com-
mensurable under a common set of metrics (Espeland and Stevens, 1998), to paraphrase 
Gerlitz and Rieder (2018), not all likes and shares are created equal.
Starting with 22 stories from BuzzFeed’s list (Silverman, 2016), we used the 
CrowdTangle tool to look at public Facebook pages and groups in which they were 
posted.3 This provided a different perspective to aggregated metrics, unpacking how 
engagement was organised on Facebook as well as what mobilised engagement, includ-
ing which pages and groups share junk news stories and how much, as well as what these 
groups were about (Figure 7). While the stories were about elections, we found that the 
groups were not just about electoral politics but also a wide range of other topics and 
issues such as entertainment (‘Movie Quotes’), clickbait (‘All Viral Videos’), cultural 
institutions (‘Los Angeles Punk Museum’) and music (‘The Guitar Mag’). In contrast to 
aggregated engagement metrics, page- and group-level views show how junk news con-
tent serves to gather and mobilise audiences for different purposes.
As fact-checking has been positioned as one of the major responses to junk news 
(including through partnerships between big technology companies such as Facebook and 
Google), we examined whether debunking content is acknowledged by pages and groups 
that share junk stories. To this end, we took a list of URLs from fact-checking initiatives 
and used the CrowdTangle browser extension to see to what extent fact-checking responses 
were shared in the same spaces that the stories circulated (Figure 8). We found that it was 
very rare for pages that shared junk news stories (orange) to also share fact-checking cor-
rections (titles of pages that share both stories and fact-checks are marked in red).
Prompted by the infrastructural uncanny of junk news surpassing mainstream news con-
tent in aggregated engagement metrics, we repurposed lists of highly engaged pages in order 
to explore the sociotechnical organisation of engagement on Facebook. This suggests the 
many different roles that junk content serves to mobilise and assemble audiences through 
platform features such as public pages and groups, as specific ways of ‘making people up’ 
(Hacking, 1985) and ‘inventing the social’ (Marres et al., 2018). While social media 
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platforms conspicuously reinscribe ‘classic social formations’ such as friendship networks 
and community groups (Marres and Gerlitz, 2018), the infrastructural uncanny of unsettling 
metrics surfaces the comparatively inconspicuous participation of nonhuman actors such as 
platform features, junk content, bots and algorithms in the co-production of social life.
Tracking infrastructures and the commodification of attention
This is the arrhythmic, disturbing heart of the affair: that the internet made it so simple for these 
young men to finance their material whims and that their actions helped deliver such momentous 
consequences. (Subramanian, 2017)
Russia, Romania and Macedonia are known to be the source of much of the fake news on the 
internet. (Dell, 2018)
Our third scenography focuses on the infrastructural uncanny that arises from the unan-
ticipated effects of web economies. In particular, we examine the unexpected participation 
of distant and not so distant content producers in domestic politics enabled by online adver-
tising industries for monetising digital content through the commodification of attention.
After the 2016 US elections, journalists reported on how teenagers from a small 
Macedonian town were making money through political clickbait about American poli-
tics (Subramanian, 2017). Investigations have raised doubts about whether their activi-
ties were spontaneous or orchestrated (Cvetkovska et al., 2018). The economic success 
Figure 7. Public pages and groups which share junk news (Bounegru et al., 2018: 28–29).
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of such viral content farming is said to depend on the combination of low-cost clickbaity 
content production, with what in advertising is known as ‘click arbitrage’. This notion 
refers to buying website traffic cheaply through advertising on platforms such as 
Facebook so that revenue can be made through ad networks such as Google’s AdSense 
(Nickel, n.d.; cf. Dewey, 2016; Silverman and Alexander, 2016; Subramanian, 2017).
While debates about the economics of junk news have focused on sanctioning dis-
reputable publishers by blacklisting them from ad networks and flagging their content on 
Facebook, in this infrastructural scenography, we extend the frame from problematic 
sources to the networks involved in capturing, measuring, calculating and monetising 
audiences. Researchers have argued that online audience marketplaces (Napoli, 2010) 
have become increasingly complex as exchanges between supply and demand sides of 
advertising inventories are enabled through an increasingly large number of interdepend-
ent intermediaries, including ad networks, ad exchanges, data brokers and online plat-
forms (Nieborg, 2016; Turow, 2011).
The methodological tactic in this scenography is to extract data on third-party-track-
ing infrastructures from both mainstream and junk news sites to explore the online audi-
ence marketplaces that underpin them. As we will show, this analysis re-does the 
spatiality of junk news from a focus on Macedonian, Romanian or Russian towns right 
back to the backyards of targeted countries. It reframes the problem as not just one of 
remote producers of troubling content but rather as one of transnational audience market-
places that link what Marres (2018) ironically calls ‘undisciplined youth from out of 
town’ with home-grown online advertising and marketing industries.
Online audience marketplace configurations are enabled by an ‘invisible data mining 
infrastructure’ of cookies, beacons and other devices which enable user behaviour to be 
tracked in site and across the web by establishing data flows between websites and vari-
ous third-party services (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013). With the caveats that web tracking 
is not just for advertising and that audience marketplaces involve more than just web 
trackers, in this scenography, we draw on Callon and Muniesa’s (2005) notion of markets 
as ‘calculative collective devices’ (Callon et al., 2007) to attend to the work that web 
tracking does to materialise relations, exchanges and data flows.
We use a corpus of 19 US-based mainstream news sites and 19 junk news sites from 
a list compiled by BuzzFeed News (the homepage and five popular article pages per site) 
to identify third-party-tracking devices embedded in successful content from these sites 
using the Digital Methods Initiative Tracker Tracker tool. The tool repurposes the 
Ghostery browser extension to compare the presence of trackers across the websites (van 
der Velden, 2018) and to study their ‘tracker networks’ (Helmond, 2017). We used Gephi 
to visually explore tracking networks, in which junk and mainstream news sites are 
embedded through a force-directed spatialization technique (Jacomy et al., 2014) so that 
the distribution of nodes in the network can be interpreted as ‘a proxy of their structural 
similarity’ (Venturini et al., 2017, p. 4).
The resulting network (Figure 9) does not suggest a sharp, binary distinction between 
the tracking practices of mainstream and junk news producers but rather a range of dif-
ferent audience marketplace configurations which they share and through which they can 
be differentiated. This includes configurations common to smaller-scale operations cov-
ering a large proportion of junk content URLs (pink); as well as highly customised 
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configurations involving specialised services and large numbers of intermediaries and 
data brokers specific to the larger media organisations in our corpus (blue). Mainstream 
news websites thus appear to be both more intrusive and more diverse in their tracking 
practices, suggesting the extent of dependence on advertising revenues. Third-party 
trackers (n = 285) received more connections (3763) from the 106 mainstream news page 
URLs than from the 113 junk news page URLs (2134) in our corpus. News sites also 
connect to a larger number of unique tracking elements (243) than junk news sites (144).
Also notable are the monopolistic tendencies resulting from the platformisation or 
extension of big US-based online platforms such as Google, Twitter and Facebook in the 
space of audience measurement and monetisation. While such tendencies have always 
been present in the audience measurement industry (Napoli, 2010), our analysis suggests 
that big online platforms have come to dominate online audience marketplaces (cf. Libert 
and Nielsen, 2018). The asymmetries between digital content producers and the digital 
Figure 9. Mainstream news and junk content URLs and their audience marketplace 
configurations, as seen through third-party-tracking networks in which they are embedded.
Regions are visually distinguished by colour.4
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Table 1. Overview of scenographies responding to infrastructural uncanny of ‘fake news’.
Manifestation of the 
uncanny
Infrastructures giving 
rise to the uncanny
Methodological tactic Key findings
Junk political news 
URLs at top of 
search engine results
Links as currency of 
the informational web; 
the link economy; 
Google search engine 
as key actor in this 
economy
Repurposing search 
results to examine 
referential practices of 
top ranked websites 
for queries associated 
with particular junk 
news stories
Junk news sites 
absent from top 
search results, but 
present through 
referencing 
practices of top 
ranked sites
Junk political news 
stories more 
engaged with than 
mainstream political 
news stories on 
Facebook
Like, share and other 
engagement metrics as 
currencies of the social 
web; the like economy; 
Facebook as key actor 
in this economy
Repurposing 
aggregated metrics to 
examine character of 
engagement
Junk news plays 
different functions 
and fact-checked 
responses rarely 
shared in spaces 
where it thrives
Remote junk 
news producers 
monetising content 
about politics 
through established 
advertising industries
Online audience 
markets enabled by 
tracking infrastructures
Mapping tracking 
infrastructures of 
successful junk and 
mainstream news 
stories to examine 
online audience 
marketplace practices
Participation of 
non-local actors 
in producing 
political content is 
enabled by markets 
dominated by US 
tech/advertising 
companies
advertising industry are illustrated by the scale at which major content producers have 
become vehicles for intrusive digital advertising and data collection practices: over two-
thirds of all tracking elements in this study are advertising related.
While the infrastructural uncanny arises from the ambiguities and unsettling effects of 
the unexpected participation of non-local ‘distant’ actors in the production of politically 
themed junk news content (suggesting trouble from afar, for example, Central and 
Eastern Europe), this scenography shifts focus back to ‘domestic’ US and Western 
European advertisers, marketers and technology companies that dominate online audi-
ence markets as well as associated tracking infrastructures which participate in the mon-
etisation of junk and mainstream news alike.
Conclusion
This article suggests that the uncanny prompted by junk news can be taken as an empiri-
cal occasion to explore the infrastructures which enable these unsettling effects. Like 
Nathaniel’s telescope in Hoffmann’s Sandman, it is the work of infrastructures which 
precipitates the ambiguities and anxieties which can be understood as uncanny. Three 
scenographies explored in our Field Guide to ‘Fake News’ illustrate methodological 
tactics for exploring infrastructures as relational, collective accomplishments through 
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which content is ranked, engagement is metrified and attention is commodified by links, 
likes and trackers (Table 1). While methods associated with the link economy, like econ-
omy and tracking infrastructures focus on the formatting and stabilisation of social life 
in order to quantify, value and marketise content and products, our scenographies explore 
methodological tactics for scrutinising how online activity is rendered quantifiable, valu-
able and marketisable, thus redrawing and providing alternative perspectives on the ena-
bling conditions and troubling effects of junk news.
The infrastructural uncanny does not just raise technical problems to be solved by 
engineers and algorithm experts (an outlook which commentators have critiqued as 
‘Band Aid solutionism’, boyd, 2017a, 2017b) nor it is solely about psychological feel-
ings or aesthetics of anxiety. Instead, it raises questions about what it means to be part of 
a society which is co-constituted by digital infrastructures. This uncanniness emphasises 
how infrastructures are not just extraneous constraints which may be shed; they are 
rather deeply embedded in the fabrics and routine functioning of many aspects of collec-
tive life (Peters, 2015). What characterises the uncanny is precisely the entanglement 
between that which has become familiar, habitual or banal, and the unsettling, which has 
the potential to transform the familiar.
In our scenographies, the infrastructural uncanny surfaces tensions involved in com-
mercialisation of online content as part of what Dean (2009) calls ‘communicative capi-
talism’ as well as how ‘the extension of the price mechanism to more and more domains 
of life, invariably with the help of information technology, clashes with other systems 
of valuation’ (Rieder, 2017). The operations of ranking, metrification and commodifica-
tion associated with the link economy, the like economy and online audience market-
places prioritise ways of both organising the web and ‘doing the social’ in accordance 
with such commercialisation strategies. In the case of the US elections, the techno-
commercial configuration of the web created conditions for political junk news content 
to thrive. While rankings, metrics and tracking aim to render online activity commensu-
rable for specific forms of value extraction such that ‘the social is collapsed with the 
traceable’ (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013), these renderings can also produce uncanny side 
effects.
Rather than trying to fix online platforms, methodological tactics such as those illus-
trated in our three scenographies may help to render these infrastructures visible and 
actionable in other ways – including for critique, intervention and alternatives. The 
infrastructural uncanny of junk news may be taken not just an opportunity for optimisa-
tion (as feedback in a system), but also as an occasion to discuss different positions and 
interests in society (cf. Marres, 2005; Mouffe, 2013). While the fake news scandal has 
prompted numerous remedial projects, policy consultations, startups, platform features 
and algorithmic innovations (cf. Bakir and McStay, 2018; Lazer et al., 2018), there is 
also a case for – to paraphrase Haraway (2016) – slowing down and dwelling with the 
infrastructural trouble. As public debates, controversies and imaginaries around digital 
technologies and digital culture continue to proliferate – from machine-learning to face-
recognition to viral content – the infrastructural uncanny may be a useful concept for 
re-appraising how agential capacities are redistributed through digital infrastructures, 
for examining what is at stake and for informing interventions to re-align infrastructures 
with different societal interests, visions and values.
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Notes
1. Although some suggest not to use the term ‘fake news’ (e.g. Habgood-Coote, 2018; Wardle 
and Derakhshan, 2017), we use it in an emic sense to refer to the social disturbance precipi-
tated by a variety of false, misleading or problematic online content. We think it is impor-
tant to recognise the role of this term in relation to a range of issues, and to study how it 
has become contested (cf. Farkas and Schou, 2018; Harsin, 2018), rather than abandoning 
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because it has become contested. Thus, we mainly use the term to refer to how it has been 
used by others. To describe the phenomenon under investigation, we use the term ‘junk news’ 
(see Venturini, 2019), which focuses not just on the intrinsic qualities of online content (fal-
sity, poor quality, deceptiveness, etc.) but also the viral circulation that it enjoys through the 
infrastructural conditions examined in this article.
2. In a similar vein, the term ‘uncanny valley’ in the field of robotics alludes to the unsettling 
effects of when automaton seems ‘too human’ (Mori, 2012).
3. We focused on public pages and groups, as access to private posts is restricted. At the time of 
the analysis, CrowdTangle returned the top 500 most popular public posts to verified pages as 
well as to pages with more than 125,000 fans according to their website.
4. This image is reproduced from Liliana Bounegru’s doctoral dissertation, ‘News Devices: 
How Digital Objects Participate in News and Research’ (jointly awarded by the University of 
Groningen and Ghent University).
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